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to make, alter, or ratify a contract at his own will and pleasure with
the consent of the party contracting with him, or if he stands by and
permits others to work for him, and accepts the work, the law implies
a promise to pay its value; while an officer of a corporation has no
power to make a contract except in the manner pointed out by the
statute from which the power is derived." Zottman, v. San Francisco,
20 Calif. 96 (1862).
This does not seem so harsh a rule against the party contracting
with a municipal corporation when it is remembered that such a party
is presumed to know the powers and limitations of the corporation to
make contracts. The loser knowingly took the risk. "Persons contracting with a municipal corporation must, at their peril, inquire into
the power of its officers to make contracts." City of Bowling Green
v. Gaines, 123 Ky. 562, 96 S. W 852 (1906).
New York makes exception to the rule in cases where there hag
been an attempt in good faith to carry out the requirements of the
statute. N. River Elec. L. & P Co. v. New York, 62 N. Y. S. 726 (1900).
Also when a contract is made in an emergency when it is not practicable to follow the statutory requirements. Sheehan v. New York, 75
N. Y. S. 802 (1902).
The only argument offered in support ol the minority line of decisions (represented by Westbrook v. Middlecliff and Fargo Foundry
v. Calloway, supra), is that it is not justice, where a contract is
entered into between a municipality and another, in good faith, and the
corporation has received the benefits, to permit the corporation to
retain the benefits without paying the reasonable value therefor, the
same as a private corporation or an individual would have to do. This
does not seem sufficiently, to answer the argument that a city having
a limited power to contract cannot be held liable beyond those limits.
Because of constitutional and statutory provisions in Kentucky
(Ky. Const., secs. 157, 162, 164, Ky. St 2741a-2, 2741m-1 and standard
city charter provisions), all cases in this state fall in classification
(b), and the principal case follows a long line of Kentucky decisions
which have consistently followed the majority rule stated above.
No cases have arisen in Kentucky analogous to the exceptional
cases decided in New York but in view of the uncompromising position
of the Kentucky court on the subject, it seems safe to predict that no
exceptions would be- made.
BRucE Mor oRFO.
JuRrsDIcTIoN'-Srus0ov UrImE.-A newspaper of recent date contained an account of a very peculiar murder. A, while standing in
West Virginia, shot across the border and killed B, who was standing
in Kentucky. A was brought to trial in West Virginia on a murder
charge, but was released because the court held that it did not have
jurisdiciton. to try the offense since the murder occurred in Kentucky.
This case raises an,interesting question, and an important one
also, since upon this decision may rest the safety of a number of in-
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dividuals. The decision will undoubtedly shock the sense of justice
of the layman, who cannot perceive of an admitted murderer going
unpunished because of peculiar technicalities in our legal structure,
but it is only too often that our judges, hardened as they are to seeing
such diabolical decisions rendered in self-styled "courts of justice"
under the guise of adherence to rigid principles of the common law,
are content to remain passive and let the law continue its course of
unethical justice because of stare decisis. It is to be hoped that some
fearless judge, operating under the broad principles of justice in its
true sense, will have the courage to render a decision on this subject
more in keeping with the substantive rights of mankind.
It is conceded that the case has the weight of authority behind it,
there being hardly a case contra. However, if the case reaches a poor
result, and the obstacles standing in the way of a better decision can
be removed, there is no reason why courts should continue to reach
this poor result.
Chancellor Kent (1 Comm. 477), very aptly stated that it would
not do "to press too strongly the rule of stare decssis.
Even a
series of decisions are not always conclusive, and the revision of a
decision often resolves itself into a mere question of expediency." His
remark has received added force by the fact that the overruled decisions now number several thousand.
State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602 (1844), is probably the
leading case on this subject, reaching the same decision as the West
Virginia court, and, since the West Virginia case has not been reported, it would perhaps be well to examine this case as a basis for
discussion. It may be assumed that the West Virginia case went upon
the same ground.
In State v. Hall, the accused, standing in North Carolina, shot
across the border into Tennessee, where the bullet killed the victim.
The North Carolina court released Hall upon the ground that "one
state or sovereign cannot enforce the penal laws or criminal laws, or
pumsh crimes of offenses committed in and against another state or
sovereignty." The learned judge then stated as a matter of fact that
"the impinging of the weapon is the criminal act, and whether the.
missile passes over a boundary in the act of striking is a matter of no
consequence. The accused constructively followed the bullet into Tennessee." Thus, having accepted the constructive presence fiction as a
fact, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that this is an offense
wholly against another sovereignty, and since North Carolina has no
power to punish this crime, the accused must be set free.
Before whole heartedly accepting the court's theory as to location
of the crime, it is only reasonabl6 that one should analyze, the crime
itself. Thd basic proposition of criminal law is that a crime consists
of two elements, both of which are- essential, and without which there
can be no crime. These elements are the intent, or mens rea, and the
overt act: Gordor v. -State, 52 Ala. 309 (1875), Com. v. Mixer, 93 N. E.
249 (Mass. 1910), State v. Asher, 8& S. W 177 (Ark. 1888). The. de-
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cision of Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40 (1880), states that "the crime of
murder consists in the inflicting of a fatal wound coupled with requisite contemporaneous intent or design, which legally renders it
felonious."
If we apply these two elements to the facts of State v. Hall, we
find that the mens rea must have been in the mind of the accused.
which was certainly in North Carolina. The act consists of the
physical movement of the actor in pulling the trigger and discharging
the weapon plus the act of the bullet traveling through space until
it strikes the victim. The act, then, occurs partly in North Carolina
and partly in Tennessee. This analysis seems to indicate that one
element, the intent, has as its locale North Carolina, and the manifestation m the external world occurs in both. Though it is impossible
to categorically classify the relative value of these elements as requisites of the crime, it is difficult to ascertain why, since an essential
ingredient resides in North Carolina, aild since without it there could
be no crime, North Carolina has not as much interest in this case as
Tennessee. Especially is this true since both the accused and the
deceased were residents and citizens of North Carolina, though this
should have no bearing on the decision other than to strengthen it.
One might surmise that the learned judge realized the unfortunate
position into which he was slipping, for his next proposition seems
to be an attempt to bolster by fiction that which could not be bolstered
by fact. This assertion is that the accused constructively accompanied
the missile across the boundary until it struck the deceased. This
statement is absolutely false in fact, and has no logical basis. Had
the court no fixed notion in mind when he uttered tins, he might
have, and with as much reason, said that when the defendant leveled
his gun and drew a bead upon his target, he constructively drew his
target across the border into the same state as he himself stood.
It seems an enormous burden for fiction to bear when it must
engage in this interstate commerce, but if it must act as a carrier,
the question might aptly be raised, "Why did not fiction carry the
deceased into North Carolina, rather than the defendant into Tennessee?" We can only assume that the court had a ready answer in
mind, for it is nowhere to be found m the decision.
Finally, the rule that one sovereign cannot enforce the penal laws
of another had its historical origin largely upon the fact that the jury
must come from the vicinage where the crime was committed, and a
jury of one place could -not enquire into the facts occurring at another
place. This rule at the time of its adoption had a very practical
foundation, the limited means of transportation, but 'With the modern
methods of travel and communication, the necessary jurymen and,
witnesses may be brought to the place of trial with little or no inconvenience, and the reason for the rule is obliterated.
Another reason for this rule was the lack of interest of the other
sovereign. It seems that this reason had no place in this particular
case, because .the shot was fired from the sovereign state trying the
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case, and the murderer resides within its boundaries. These facts
should give it sufficient interest to try the case.
The final reason which may be advanced for tbis ruld is that the
punishment should be inflicted by the sovereign which has been injured. Such a notion is the ancient revenge theory of punishment and
has no place in an enlightened civilization. The object of punishment
should "represent a means calculated to effect the cessation of the
criminal's harmfulness to society." Criminology by Garofalo, p. 406.
Mr. Moss in his work, Applications of Psychology, p. 293, states,
"At the present time the most widely accepted motive underlying
punishment is protection.
A new attitude is developing toward'the criminal. The keynote of this attitude is neither revenge nor
protection of society, but the reformation and rehabilitation of the
criminal." This modern trend overthrows this ancient barbaric conception of punishment, and does away with the last objection in this
case.
Now that the technical obstacle in the way of giving North Carolina jurisdiction have been in some measure answered, we may look
for cases which may seem to strengthen this position. Conceding that
there are no cases bearing out this new view directly, there are cases
which seem to be analogous to this set of facts.
The case of U. S. v. Werral, 2 DalI. 384 (Pa. 1798), was the trial
of an indictment for an attempt to bribe a public officer. The court
held that it is sufficient to sustain the indictment that the letter offering the bribe was mailed at a post office within the jurisdiction. The
court said, "The opposite doctrine, indeed, would furnish absolute impunity to every offender of this kind whose crime was not commenced
and consummated in the same district." This language assumes a
peculiar significance when one sees the case of State v. HaZI, 20 S. E.
729 (N. C. 1894), the interstate rendition proceedings growing out of
the case under discussion. The court in that case held that one who
has not actually been within the territorial limits' of the state since
the commission of the crime with which he is charged, though it was.
constructively committed therein, cannot "flee from justice, and be
found in another state" within Const. U. S. Art. 4, Sec. 2, Ch. 2, providing that a person so doing shall be surrendered on demand of the
state from which he fled, and the governor has no authority to surrender the accused under such circumstances.
It occurs to one that this decision affords a great opportunity for
one to remove his enemies if he is only clever enough to entice them
to the state line, and declares an open season on foreigners within
rifle shot of the border. The Pennsylvania case, though an attempt
case, is closely analogous, and the language quoted from the decision
-is certainly in point.
A line of decisions cited in Clark and Marshall on Crimes, Sec. 497,
(3d Ed. 1927), and discussed in 3 Pa. L. J. 167, hold that where the
-waters of a stream in one county are polluted by a mill in an adjoin-
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ing county, the offense is indictable in the latter county. These decisions are upon the same point, and the same principles should apply.
In view of the above contentions, it is submitted that the case
reaches the improper result and since the technicalities can be worked
out, the court should have reached an opposite decision.
Rather than defy the established rule on this point, however, the
court risked the criticism offered in the old English case of Scott v.
Shiepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525, where it was said that "when with the
help of the 'written law, one succeeds in fitting a given crime into
a given legal paragraph, then one's own sense of justice is satisfied,
and the responsibility of a possible injustice is then shouldered by
the impersonal written law."
Mr. A. Levitt, 16 J. Crim. L. 316, at 324, most admirably stated the
situation when he said "you cannot protect the modern world from
the modern criminal by setting up arbitrary limits to places where
he can be punished. On the contrary, the criminal is aided and encouraged in committing hIs offenses because he knows that in most
instances he will not be punished for his offenses if he stays away
from the place where he committed them. All he needs to do is to step
over a boundary line and he can thumb his nose at those who pursue
him."
KIR B. MoERLEY.

